In fact, the US Army’s conception of how it fights is so “guerrilla-esque” it could be used as a definition of guerrilla warfare. The US Army describes its “Unified Land Operations” as a method that “begins and ends with the exercise of collective and individual initiative to gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of the enemy’s organization.” Guerrilla organizations also stress individual initiative, only fight where they possess an advantage, and fight throughout the depth of the enemy organization rather than recognize front lines. The difference is that guerrilla warfare lacks front lines and large-scale, set-piece battles – the defining characteristics of conventional conflict.”Īre set-piece battles and front lines still defining characteristics of conventional conflict? A quick look at modern descriptions of combat belies the notion. “At the lowest level, guerrilla war has much in common with the small-unit tactics of conventional armies: both rely on ambush and rapid movement. In his recent book, Invisible Armies, Max Boot also points out the similarities: This last statement – that activity is tied to political objectives – is of course applicable to all warfare. There is no great novelty in it… What is new… is the application of guerrilla activity, in a conscious and deliberate way, to specific political objectives…” “The policy of hitting the enemy when he is weak, evading him when he is strong, taking the offensive when he falls back, circling around when he advances- all of this is only common sense. Robert Taber recognized the similarities as well: Avoid the solid, attack the hollow attack withdraw deliver a lightning blow… engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances harass him when he stops strike him when he is weary pursue him when he withdraws…the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.” “based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack… select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west. Mao Tse-Tung, arguably the greatest theorist of guerrilla warfare, described guerrilla tactics as: Lawrence described the guerrilla tactics his Arab revolt would use against the Ottomans in terms of “orthodoxy” that were simply translated to the characteristics of his forces and terrain. Similarities can be seen in definitions of guerrilla and conventional warfare. At the same time, a focus on allegedly new tactics cannot be allowed to obscure higher, and more important, issues of strategy. This is a vital point for those thinking about strategy to understand since matters of strategy rest on tactics. In fact, there is no meaningful difference between conventional and guerrilla (or irregular) warfare when it comes to tactics, and continued artificial segregation obscures more important military issues. It is built on a false assumption: that there are two different styles of warfare. This conversation garnered so much emphasis that glaring issues of strategy were largely ignored. The discussion is based on one assumption: that conventional tactics and irregular tactics are different. As the United States and its allies waged two wars against irregular actors in the last decade, the need to understand the conflicts in which the West was engaged spawned an industry of theorists discussing the phenomenon, and a few evangelists who feared a US shift to irregular warfare.